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Regional Jet Trade Wars: Politics and
Compliance in WTO Dispute Resolution
Helena D. Sullivan1
INTRODUCTION
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 2 part of the
Uruguay Round, has taken a new approach to resolution of con-
flicts between World Trade Organization (WTO) member states.
This new approach is much like the traditional national sys-
tems, which are intended to have a binding effect. The authority
of such a system depends on members setting aside political
considerations, such as DSU cases naturally engender, to re-
spect their WTO obligations. Theoretically, all members of the
WTO would benefit from such a binding arrangement to resolve
conflicts.
In the history of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), there
have been several major challenges to the authority of the new
dispute settlement system. These disputes between the United
States and the European Union over bananas, 3 hormone-treated
beef,' and the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation Tax Regime have
attracted considerable attention.5 Disputes between these WTO
"heavy hitters" have already come close to testing the authority
1. Judicial Law Clerk, United States Court of International Trade; LL.M. (In-
ternational Legal Studies), New York University School of Law; LL.B., University of
Alberta Faculty of Law.
2. GATT Secretariat, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral
Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.orgfEnglish/docs/
legal.e/final-e.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Final Act].
3. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities Regime for the Impor-
tation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas,WT/DS27/AB/R, 37 I.L.M. 243 (1998),
available at www.wto.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
4. WTO Arbitration Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/ARB, 37 I.L.M. 1246 (1998), available at www.wto.org (last
visited Nov. 1, 2002).
5. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations," WTJDS108/AB/R, 39 I.L.M. 717 (2000), available at
www.wto.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
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of the system, as member states have essentially refused to sub-
vert domestic political considerations to WTO rulings. How-
ever, lurking deep in the headlines of local newspapers is a bit-
ter dispute between Canada and Brazil regarding subsidies for
regional jet aircraft manufacturers.7  Although the Can-
ada/Brazil jet subsidies dispute is lesser known, it may create
implications for the WTO that reach far beyond the effects on
these two countries.
The jet subsidies dispute illustrates several complications
with the WTO's new approach to conflict resolution, adopted in
1994.8 This dispute is a prime example of the tension that WTO
dispute settlement can produce between developed and develop-
ing member states. In Brazil's view, the Canadian complaint
brought against Brazil in the WTO presents a serious threat to
its aspiration to become a First World nation.9 Additionally, the
case reveals potential problems with the calculations of coun-
termeasures because the stated intention of such retaliatory
measures is not to punish or to compensate, but to induce com-
pliance.'0 So far, the countermeasures have not been successful
in this role." This case may also force the WTO to confront the
thorny question of whether the DSU was meant to provide a
truly binding system.
This article will recount how a typical dispute over subsi-
dies evolves into a conflict that may have potential repercus-
sions for many industries and set a dangerous precedent of non-
compliance with Panel and Appellate Body rulings. Part I will
explain the dispute between Canada and Brazil and the new
mechanism for dispute resolution. Part II will review the Panel
and Appellate Body decisions made in this dispute. Part III will
detail the evolution of a trade war between Canada and Brazil.
Part IV will analyze the issues raised by this dispute and sug-
gest possible solutions.
6. See Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef and Compliance in the World
Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve
Compliance from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133 (2001).
7. Id.
8. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Re-
form in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 (1994).
9. Mark MacKinnon, Brazil Has Much at Stake in Jet Dogfight, GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 3, 2001, at B1.
10. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1239.
11. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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I. REGIONAL JET SUBSIDY DISPUTE
Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the central element of the
WTO dispute settlement system is "providing security and pre-
dictability to the multilateral trading system."'2 If both Canada
and Brazil defy the system, that security and predictability may
be undermined. The series of decisions by the panel, Appellate
Body, and Arbitration Panel, largely in Canada's favor, included
some of the most significant determinations in the history of the
DSU on retaliatory measures. 13 However, these rulings have
done little to resolve the trade problems between the two coun-
tries. Instead, recent events, including outrage, accusations of
pretextual retaliation, and threats by Brazil over a controversial
Canadian ban on beef imported from Brazil on "mad cow dis-
ease" grounds, 4 only seem to suggest that the situation is esca-
lating.
A. THE NEW MECHANISM FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Under the DSU, the preferred method of resolution of a
GATT dispute is still termination of the offending measure."
However, the DSU has new "teeth." If termination does not
happen, the DSU requires the offending member state to inform
the DSB, within thirty days of the adoption of the report, of the
member state's intention with regard to the offending measure."
The member state has a reasonable period to comply, but what
is reasonable is now subject to DSB scrutiny. The DSB then
closely examines the offending member state's implementation
of its recommendation. If the offending measure is not removed
within a reasonable period, there are several options.' First,
the offending state may negotiate with the complaining state for
12. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1227.
13. MacKinnon, supra note 9.
14. Mark MacKinnon, Health Canada Suspends Scientist, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), Feb. 21, 2001, at A5.
15. Final Act, supra note 2, at 1227-28. Article 3.8 of the DSU states that for
breach of the covered agreements, there is a presumption of nullification or impair-
ment of benefits, so that the party in breach bears the burden of proof. Id. If a
measure has been found to be in breach, Article 3.7 of the DSU states that when
withdrawal of the measure is the first objective of the dispute settlement mecha-
nism, compensation should be resorted to only if immediate withdrawal is impracti-
cable. Id.
16. Id. at art. 21.3, at 1238.
17. Id. at arts. 21.6, 21.22, at 1239-41 (stating that DSB approval, agreement
between the parties, or binding arbitration is required).
18. Id.
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mutually acceptable compensation. 9 Second, the complaining
party, with DSB, approval may retaliate by suspending conces-
sions or other obligations.2 ° Suspension of concessions is only
used as a last resort because of the trade-distorting impact the
suspensions have. Moreover, the retaliation must be equivalent
to the level of impairment or nullification of benefits, and if pos-
sible, should be directed to the same industry as the one in-
volved in the original complaint."' If the offending state objects
to the level of retaliation, the parties must arbitrate before the
original panel, if it can be reassembled.22 Nevertheless, such re-
taliation must cease if the offending measure is removed or oth-
erwise resolved, as the DSU makes it clear that the system is
not punitive. In the dispute over jet subsidies, however, the
success of the DSB in inducing compliance must be evaluated in
the context of Brazil's desire to advance beyond 'developing
country' status.
B. THE DISPUTE HEATS UP
The market for regional jet aircraft has been robust in the
last decade, creating tension between Canada and Brazil as they
compete in this lucrative market. Between 1970 and 1998, the
number of passengers on regional jets grew at an average an-
nual rate of 11.5 percent.22 In 1998, about 200 million passen-
gers were transported on regional jets, an over $8 billion (U.S.) a
year industry.24 Airlines have increasingly been replacing turbo
prop aircraft with regional jets, which now comprise more than
eighty percent of the orders for new aircraft.25 Two of the major
players in the regional aircraft industry are Canada's Bombar-
dier and Brazil's Embraer.26 By 1999, Embraer had an annual
gross revenue of $1.8 billion (U.S.), which was a 405 percent in-
19. Final Act, supra note 2, at art. 22.2.
20. Id.
21. If impossible, it should be extended to other sectors covered by the same
agreement. Id. If that is impractical, then it may be extended to sectors covered by
another agreement. Id. at art. 22.3, at 1239-40.
22. Id. at art. 22.6, at 1240. There is a deadline of sixty days from the expira-
tion of the reasonable period. Id.
23. Bombardier Aerospace Regional Market Outlook 1999, SpeedNews Aircraft
Fleets and Statistics, available at http://www.speednews.com/lists/lists.shtml (last
visited Oct. 7, 2002).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. MacKinnon, supra note 9.
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crease over its 1995 revenue of $356 million (U.S.).27 By 1999,
Bombardier had 17.3 of the U.S. regional lift capacity with its
"Regional Jet," followed by the Embraer ERJ 145 with 12.6 per-
cent.28 Despite its problems with Canada, Embraer's revenue
has continued to increase, with the 2000 Embraer Annual Re-
port 29 showing revenue of $2.859 billion (U.S.) to Bombardier's
2000 revenue of $13.6 billion (U.S.), $8.1 billion (U.S.) of which
31
resulted from aerospace.
To gain insight into the importance of the aerospace indus-
try to Brazil, it is desirable to understand Sao Jose dos Campos,
an area northeast of Sao Paolo, which has been described as the
"Silicon Valley of Brazil. 31  This area is far more prosperous
than other Brazilian centers and wages in this city are high by
Brazilian standards.32 San Jose dos Campos' business center is
Embraer SA with about 10,000 employees of its own. Since pri-
vatizing in 1994, it has become the largest exporter in Brazil
and the world's fourth largest commercial airplane producer.33
Embraer has a strategic role in Brazil's defense system, with
over fifty percent of the Brazilian Air Force fleet using Embraer
products.34 Embraer also focuses on the regional jet market
with customers such as Air France, American Airlines, and
Swissair.3' Embraer is second only to Canada's Bombardier in
the regional jet market.36 To Brazilians, Embraer is more than
a corporation, it is a symbol of Brazilian success in a "First
World" industry, thus representing their hopes for the future.37
27. Brazil Economic Brief No. 01-2000, available at http://www.brasilemb.org/
beb/BIB%201%20-%2OJanuary2O2000.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002) and
http://www.financialpost.com/demos/FPCPdemo/C3Itemb.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2002). Bombardier, which has other divisions in addition to aerospace, had 1999
operating revenues of $11.5 billion (Can.), $6.4 billion of which was related to aero-
space. Id.
28. Regional Airline Association, Regional Airlines Achieve Impressive Growth
in 2000, Table 3, at http://www.raa.org/newsdesk/2000yrdend.htm (last visited Oct.
10, 2002).
29. Embraer, Annual Report 2000, at http://www.embraer.com (last visited Oct.
10, 2002).
30. Bombardier, Annual Report Year Ended January 31, 2001, available at
http://www.bombardier.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
31. MacKinnon, supra note 9.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Larry Rohter, Brazil's Hot Commodity? Not Coffee or Soccer, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2000, § 3, at 1.
35. MacKinnon, supra note 9.
36. Id.; Heather Scoffield, Bombardier-Embraer Dogfight Heats Up, GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 15, 1999, at B1; MacKinnonsupra note 9.
37. Brazil's top trade negotiators have often spoken of their hopes for industry
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Competition between Embraer and Bombardier is strong.
With its lower labor costs, Embraer is taking over Bombardier's
customer base.38 Even InterCanadian Airlines ordered six of
Embraer's ERJ-145 jets.39  This deal resulted in controversy
when Onex, a merger partner of Air Canada and InterCanadian,
called the deal misguided and stated publicly that InterCana-
dian should have opted for Bombardier's products. ° Onex
claimed that InterCanadian had only agreed to buy the Em-
braer planes after being offered very generous financing terms
through Brazil's PROEX program.4"
These generous financing terms were made possible by
PROEX, a program that Brazil established in 1991.42 This pro-
gram offers below market rate loans to buyers of Brazilian ex-
ports.43 The Bank of Brazil, which administers PROEX, which
makes "interest rate equalization" payments and sets the fi-
nancing conditions by ministerial decree.44 The lending bank re-
ceives payments in the form of bonds from the Brazilian gov-
ernment, redeemable only in Brazil and in Brazilian currency.45
In the case of regional jets, the term of these payments may, and
often is, extended to fifteen years.46 This reduces the cost of the
aircraft overall.
In 1998, at the urging of Bombardier and Canadian busi-
nesses, Canada challenged Brazilian support for Embraer in the
DSB, seeking a WTO Panel ruling on the Brazilian export sub-
sidies.47 Brazil argued, however, that Canada was mistaken in
expansion in technologically sophisticated goods. Scoffield, supra note 36.
38. MacKinnon, supra note 9.
39. Onex Would Push to Scrap Embraer Canada Deal, MONEY, Nov. 2, 1999, at
http://allpop.com/AirMergers/nov2-aircanonexe.mbr.html.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. WTO Dispute Panel, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999), paras. 2.1-2.6, available at http://www.wto.org [herein-
after WT/DS46/R].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. para. 4.115.
46. Id.
47. Canada originally requested consultations in the WTO on June 21, 1996.
Id. However, Canada did not pursue the matter vigorously until July 13, 1998,
when it announced that it would seek a WTO Panel ruling on the Brazilian export
subsidies. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PANEL CASES TO WHICH CANADA IS A PARTY, available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/dispute-e.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2002). See also Panel Report,
Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/5, (July. 13, 1998),
available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter WT/DS46/51.
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its belief that PROEX payments were made to the purchaser.48
Instead, they argued payments were actually being made to the
lender to offset the costs it incurred in obtaining internationally
competitive rates.4 9 From a Brazilian perspective, PROEX
merely creates a level playing field since interest rates in Brazil
are in the fifteen percent range.50 Additionally, Brazil cited
"Brazil Risk" as an added cost which PROEX was designed to
equalize." A guarantee on a loan to a financially risky regional
airline guaranteed by Canada had the security of Canada's sov-
ereign risk, whereas the same loan guaranteed by Brazil had a
sovereign risk 1,000 basis points or ten percentage points above
Canada's.52 Brazil then went on the counteroffensive by re-
questing a panel and by challenging a variety of Canadian
measures as inconsistent with WTO rules.53 Brazil's complaint
alleged that Canada's Bombardier had been supported by a va-
riety of GATT-illegal subsidy programs.54
II. THE PANELS AND APPELLATE BODY EXAMINE THE
SUBSIDY PROGRAMS
A. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
On April 14, 1999, the WTO released two relevant Panel
Reports.55 The Panel hearing the challenge to the Embraer sub-
sidies ruled in Canada's favor on eight of ten points in the chal-
lenge to the Brazilian program.56 It declared PROEX an illegal
export subsidy and required that it be withdrawn without de-
48. WTO Appellate Body, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999), reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. 9 (2000),
available at http://www.wto.org and 1999 WL 591866 [hereinafter WT/DS70/AB/R].
49. Id.
50. MacKinnon, supra note 9; see also WT/DS46/R, supra note 42.
51. The term "Brazil Risk" refers to the idea that the credit rating of the coun-
try guaranteeing the loan is very important, as it would affect the terms of the loan
granted by the lender. MacKinnon, supra note 9.
52. Id.
53. Originally, consultations were requested in WTO Dispute Panel, Canada -
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/1 and WT/DS71/1 (Mar.
14, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org. The first request for a panel did not
come until 1998, in WTO Dispute Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/2 (July 13, 1998),
available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2002) [hereinafter WT/DS70/2].
54. WT/DS70/2, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42.
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lay.17 The Panel based their finding on the Agreement on Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). 58 Article
3 of the SCM Agreement prohibits subsidies contingent on ex-
port performance, including those illustrated in Annex I, which
is referred to as the Illustrative List.59 The Panel found that
PROEX constituted a subsidy program targeted at export per-
formance, within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement and, therefore, violated Article 3 of SCM Agree-
ment." The Panel, however, declined to make a recommenda-
tion on implementation as requested by Canada, stating that
such a specific recommendation was not within its role, but held
that the offending measure had to be withdrawn within ninety
days.6 '
Canada argued that the "Brazil Risk" argument was falla-
cious since most of the lending institutions involved in the Em-
braer transactions were outside of Brazil and the PROEX pay-
ments were reducing interest rates below international market
rates. 2 Brazil countered with the argument that most of the
transactions involved lenders inside Brazil, and that even when
lenders were outside Brazil, the exporters still bore "Brazil
Risk."63 Furthermore, Brazil argued that Embraer's cost of ob-
taining credit for its customers outside Brazil from non-
Brazilian institutions reflected "Brazil Risk.""
The Panel, noting that the structure of PROEX allowed the
purchaser complete freedom to obtain financing wherever he
chose, found that Brazil had submitted no evidence to demon-
strate that PROEX did not allow the purchaser to negotiate
terms more favorable than would otherwise have been avail-
able.65 Therefore, PROEX payments were "used to secure a ma-
terial advantage."6  The Panel rejected Brazil's argument that
PROEX should be permitted because this measure does not fit
the specifications of paragraph one of item (k) of the Illustrative
List.67 This section provides:
57. Id.
58. Final Act, supra note 2, at Annex 1A.
59. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, paras. 7.113-7.37.
60. Id. paras. 8.1-8.2.
61. Id. para. 8.5.
62. Id. paras. 4.128-4.143.
63. Id. para. 4.137.
64. Id.
65. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, paras. 7.36-7.37.
66. Id. para. 7.37.
67. Id. paras. 7.113-7.37.
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(k) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by
and/or acting under the authority of governments) of export credits at
rates below those which they actually have to pay for the fumds so em-
ployed (or would have to pay if they borrowed on international capital
markets in order to obtain funds of the same maturity and other credit
terms and denominated in the same currency as the export credit), or
the payment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or
financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to
secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms.
Provided, however, that if a Member is a party to an international un-
dertaking on official export credits to which at least twelve original
Members to this Agreement are parties as of 1 January, 1979 (or a
successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original Mem-
bers), or if in practice a Member applies the interest rate provisions of
the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in confor-
mity with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy
68prohibited by this Agreement.
This unsuccessful argument was referred to as the a con-
trario argument - the theory being that any subsidy measure
that was not within the parameters of the first paragraph of
item (k) must therefore be permitted.69 However, the Panel
ruled that while it was not clear to them whether a particular
list of subsidies was permissible, PROEX was not used to secure
a material advantage in the field of export credit terms, so Bra-
zil could not use the item (k) defense." The Panel further found
that the presumption of nullification or impairment of benefits
under Article 3.8 of the DSU had not been rebutted by Brazil.7'
The Panel also found that PROEX did not fit within the ex-
ception for developing countries in Article 27 of the SCM
Agreement. 72 The Panel examined the issue of whether Article
27 of the SCM Agreement, which addresses developing country
needs, exempted Brazil from SCM Agreement Article 3.1(a).73
Article 27.2(b) provides that the prohibition of Article 3. 1(a) does
not apply to "other developing country Members for a period of
eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agree-
ment, subject to compliance with the provisions of paragraph
4.'4 Article 27.4 provides:
Any developing country Member referred to in paragraph 2(b) shall
68. Final Act, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
69. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, paras. 7.35-7.5.
70. Id.
71. Id. para. 8.3.
72. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
73. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
74. Final Act, supra note 2, at Annex 1A.
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phase out its export subsidies within the eight-year period, preferably
in a progressive manner. However, a developing country Member
shall not increase the level of its export subsidies, and shall eliminate
them within a period shorter than that provided for in this paragraph
when the use of such export subsidies is inconsistent with its develop-
ment needs[.] 
75
The Panel found that Canada had the burden of proof of es-
tablishing the applicability of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement
and the non-applicability of Article 27.4 to Brazil.78 The Panel
found that Brazil had not only failed to phase out its export sub-
sidies as required by Article 27, but had actually increased
them.77 In making this finding, the Panel held again that ac-
tual, rather than budgeted, amounts were the relevant figures
to examine regarding the level of subsidy.7 s The Panel rejected
Brazil's argument that 1991, the date of creation of the PROEX
program, was the appropriate benchmark date and not 1994,
the date immediately preceding the enactment of the SCM
Agreement. 79 The reason that Brazil made this argument was
that the level of subsidies alleged by Canada was below 1991
levels. 80 The Panel held that though Canada had failed to estab-
lish that the export subsidies were inconsistent with Brazil's de-
velopmental needs, Brazil's failure to institute a subsidy phase-
out and the increase in subsidy levels meant that these subsi-
dies did not fall within the SCM Agreement Article 27 exception
for developing countries. 8'
Concurrently, a separate panel looked at Brazil's challenges
to the Canadian measures. 2 The panel found that the Canada
Account program of debt financing for regional aircraft since
1995 and the Technology Partnerships Canada (TPC) assistance
to the regional aircraft industry violated Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement. 3 Canada Account was a program administered by
Economic Development Canada (EDC) to support export trans-
actions that the federal government deemed to be in the na-
tional interest, but which, for reasons of size or risk, could not
75. Id. at art. 27.4.
76. Id. See also WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, para. 7.57.
77. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, paras. 7.58-7.85.
78. Id. para. 7.74.
79. Id. para. 7.61.
80. Id. para. 7.63.
81. Id. paras. 7.83-7.85, 7.87-7.93.
82. WT/DS70/AB/R, supra note 48.
83. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, paras. 9.158-9.203. The TPC assistance in-
cluded an $87 million investment in Bombardier for its seventy seat CRJ project in
which TPC was to get a mere 1.76 percent return. Id. paras. 9.158-9.203.
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be supported by normal export credits." The Panel rejected
Canada's contention that "advantage" was not to be given its or-
dinary meaning, finding that the benchmark should be the cost
to government. 5 However, a number of other Canadian pro-
grams challenged by Brazil were found not to be in violation of
WTO obligations.86 Canada appealed that Panel ruling on May
3, 1999,87 and Brazil filed its own notice of appeal on the same
date.8
The Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's ruling regarding
Brazilian aircraft subsidies on August 2, 1999, as well as the
Panel ruling that the subsidy program must be withdrawn
within ninety days of the adoption of the Reports. 9 The Appel-
late Body found that there had been a violation of Section 3. 1(a)
of the SCM Agreement, that the Panel correctly held that the
complaining party had the burden of showing that Brazil did not
fall within the Article 27 exception, Canada had met its burden,
and therefore Article 3.1 applied.90 However, the Appellate Body
stated that the Panel was incorrect in its analysis of the rele-
vance of when the export subsidies had been granted.91 The
timeline surrounding the granting of the export subsidies was
only relevant to discover whether the level of subsidies had been
varied, in order to determine whether the Article 27 developing
country exception applied.92 The Appellate Body also ruled that
the proper point of reference was actual expenditures, not budg-
eted amounts, that constant dollars rather than nominal dollars
84. WT/DS70/AB/R, supra note 48.
85. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, para. 9.312.
86. These included Economic Development Canada (EDC), which Brazil argued
was prohibited since it gave higher-risk debt financing and did not collect a risk
premium, the Societe de Developpement Industriel du Quebec, and the Canada-
Quebec Subsidiary Agreements on Industrial Development. The Panel also rejected
a challenge to the sale by Ontario Aerospace Corporation to Bombardier of forty-nine
percent of the shares of de Havilland. De Havilland was an established leader in the
regional aircraft industry, and has delivered over 7,400 Twin Otter, Dash 7 and
Dash 8 turboprop aircraft in its history. See Bombardier - History, at
http://www.aerospace.bombardier.com/htmen/10_O.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
87. WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/4 (May 3, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org.
88. WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, WT/DS46/8 (May 3, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org.
89. WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, 38 I.L.M. 1708, (Aug. 2, 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter WT/DS46/AB/R].
90. Id. para. 196(b).
91. Id. paras. 154-59.
92. Id. paras. 147-49.
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were to be used in the calculation, and that the subsidies were
granted when the bonds were actually issued, not when the let-
ter of commitment was issued.93 The Appellate Body declined to
rule on whether the failure to secure a material advantage un-
der the first paragraph of item (k) of the Illustrative List meant
a measure was permitted, stating that the issue was whether
there has been a material advantage in the field of export credit
terms.94
The Appellate Body also found that the Panel had erred in
its definition of "material advantage."" Since the marketplace
was considered a relevant benchmark, the second paragraph of
item (k) of the Illustrative List, which makes reference to
agreements such as the OECD Arrangement,96 was useful as a
guide in determining whether there had been a material advan-
tage secured.97 Rather than simply being equivalent to a benefit
under SCM Agreement Article 1.1, the Appellate Body held that
"material advantage" is the difference between the actual rate of
interest paid after deduction of the government payment and
the Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR) supplied by the
OECD Arrangement."
The Appellate Body ruled that PROEX did indeed confer
such an advantage, stating that while it recognized that the
OECD Arrangement did in some circumstances allow "match-
ing" of rates to programs of other governments, resulting in
93. Id. para. 196.
94. Id. paras. 143, 147-59.
95. WT/DS46/AB/R, supra note 89, paras. 179-81.
96. This refers to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, which
places limitations on the terms and conditions of export credits that benefit export
support. Its purpose is to provide an institutional framework for an orderly market
for officially supported export credits. It therefore seeks to prevent an "export credit
race" where exporters compete to grant the most favorable subsidy from their re-
spective governments. There are minimum repayment terms, a minimum cash-
down payment, and countries are classified under two categories in which classifica-
tion is tied to GNP. Minimum interest rates that may benefit from official financing
support are referenced as Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR). They have
been established for twelve currencies, the majority of which are based upon either
the 5-year Government bond yields or on 3, 5, and 7-year bond yields, according to
the length of the repayment period. Each member may select the basis for its own
CIRR. CIRR's are adjusted monthly and are intended to reflect commercial interest
rates. Roland P. Wiederaenders, III, Export Financing Options for NAFTA Country
Businesses, NAFTA: Law and Business Reivew of the Americas, 4 NAFTA: L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 51, 53-54 (1998); see also http://www.oecd.orgEN/homeO,,EN-home-0-
nodirectorate-no-no-no-0,FF.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
97. WT/DS46/AB/R, supra note 89, paras. 181-82.
98. Id. para. 181.
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rates below the CIRR rates, that exception was not applicable in
this case.99 Comparison between net interest rates applied as a
result of a subsidy program and the total amount of subsidies
granted by another member was not allowed by the provisions of
the OECD Arrangement. °° Further, the Appellate Body noted
that interest rate equalization subsidies were provided at an
across-the-board rate of 3.8 percent for PROEX and did not vary
according to the subsidies being provided by the other member
state it was allegedly matching.'0 ' While this argument was
therefore unsuccessful, the Appellate Body stopped short of a
statement that such matching would never be permissible.
02
Nevertheless, the Brazilian argument that it should be allowed
to offset all of the Canadian subsidies for Bombardier in the cal-
culation of the subsidy of PROEX was rejected. 03
Brazil vigorously pursued its own claims in the Appellate
Body, cross-appealing issues regarding the EDC, the Canada
Account, and the TPC. In Brazil's claim against Canada, the
Appellate Body found that Canada's TPC program was not
GATT-compliant. 04 It based this decision on the finding that,
consistent with other decisions, the definition of "subsidy" in
Section 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, which refers to conferring
a benefit, means a benefit to the recipient.' 5 The yardstick for
making this determination was held to be the marketplace rate,
not the cost to government.' 6 The Appellate Body stated that
whether a subsidy was export-contingent was dependent upon
the facts, and the facts that must be taken into account vary ac-
cording to circumstances.'
0 7
The EDC provided billions of dollars in loans annually to
Canadian companies selling abroad.' 8 The Appellate Body
stated that the Panel was correct to reject the allegations
against EDC, as the Panel did not have enough evidence to sup-
port the Brazilian position that EDC offered lower than market
rate illegal loans.'0 9 The Appellate Body held that the Panel did
99. Id. para. 185.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. WT/DS46/AB/R, supra note 89, para. 185.
104. WTIDS/70AB/R, supra note 48.
105. Id.
106. Id. paras. 217-19.
107. Id. para. 169.
108. Id. para. 181 (citing WT/DS70/AB/R, supra note 48, para. 9.181).
109. Id. paras. 214-16.
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not err or abuse its discretion in refusing to draw adverse infer-
ences from Canada's refusal to provide information regarding
certain EDC debt financing, but stated that it might have de-
cided differently had the matter been before it." 0 The Appellate
Body disapproved of the Canadian lack of transparency and em-
phasized that Brazil could certainly bring a further DSB pro-
ceeding and request further information under Article 25.8 of
the SCM Agreement."' Canada was required to provide this in-
formation under Article 25.9 in order to allow Brazil to assess
compliance with SCM Agreement obligations." 2 The Appellate
Body refused to "solicit, receive or review new facts," stating
that they could not do so under Article 17.6 of the DSU.13 Then
in special session on August 20, 1999, the DSB adopted the deci-
sions of the Appellate Body.1
14
B. THE ILLUSION OF COMPLIANCE
In November 1999, Canada announced that it had fully
complied with the ruling regarding its own subsidy programs
and that it would ask the WTO to determine whether Brazil had
fully implemented the ruling and withdrawn the prohibited sub-
sidies."' Brazil announced it was proceeding with its own com-
pliance challenge." 6 Article 21.5 of the DSU provides that if
there is a dispute regarding compliance, it is to be referred,
when possible, to the original panel, which must give a ruling
within ninety days of the referral. "
7
On May 9, 2000, the reconstituted Panel found that Brazil
failed to remove the export subsidies and that changes it made
to PROEX were vastly inadequate. The Panel criticized the
failure of Brazil to do anything about PROEX support (PROEX
bonds) for future aircraft deliveries under contracts made before
110. WTfDS70/AB/R, supra note 48, para. 205.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. para. 206.
114. WTO Appellate Body Dispute Panel, Brazil - Export Financing Programme
for Aircraft, WTO/DS46/10 (Sept. 6, 1999), reprinted in 2 INT'L TRADE REP. 8 (2000),
available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2002) and 1999 WL 688121.
115. WTO Dispute Panel, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/13 (Nov. 26, 1999) reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. 8, para. 1.3 (2000),
available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter WT/DS46/13].
116. WTO Dispute Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/9 (Nov. 29, 1999), reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. 8, para. 1.3
(2000), available at http://www.wto.org.
117. Final Act, supra note 2.
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the November 18, 1999 implementation deadline. 18 There were
more than 900 of these undelivered aircraft."9 Moreover, the
Panel found that contracts made after November 18, 1999, had
also not been modified to comply with the WTO ruling.120 It
dismissed Brazil's argument that the support was necessary be-
cause of high domestic interest rates and "Brazil Risk," finding
that whether interest rates were at or above CIRR rates was
highly relevant. 12' However, the Panel found that CIRR was not
an immutable test and that if the interest rate was below
CIRR, 122 it was still proper if it was not lower than the minimum
commercial rate for that state.123 Brazil had failed to produce
any evidence of export credits being provided in the commercial
markets at the levels of PROEX.
124
One hotly contested issue revisited by the Panel was the
meaning of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies contained in
item (k) of Annex I to the SCM Agreement.' 25 Brazil argued that
since the PROEX measures were not used to secure a material
advantage, PROEX did not fall within Annex I, item (k) and,
therefore, should be permitted."2 Brazil again argued that
items not falling within paragraph one of item (k) should be in-
terpreted a contrario as a list of permitted measures. 127  The
Panel found that there were no such measures except those
permitted under Footnote 5, which states, "Measures referred to
in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be pro-
hibited under this or any other provision of this Agreement."
128
The Panel decided that this footnote merely means that any
permitted subsidies by definition did not confer material advan-
tage under item (k).129 It found that the first paragraph of item
(k) could not be used to establish an a contrario list of permitted
118. WTO Dispute Panel, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/RW (May 9, 2000), reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. 8, paras. 6.17, 7.34-
7.37 (2000), available at http://www.wto.org and 2000 WL 668957 [hereinafter
WT/DS46/RW].
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Robert Evans, Ottawa Poised for Trade War with Brazil, TORONTO STAR,
May 23, 2000, at B1, available at 2000 WL 21247570.
122. WT/DS46/RW, supra note 118, para. 6.84.
123. Id. para. 6.86.
124. Id. para. 7.36.
125. Id. para. 6.66.
126. Id.
127. Id. paras. 4.53-4.71.
128. WT/DS46/RW, supra note 118, para. 6.46.
129. Id. paras. 6.46-6.67; see also Final Act, supra note 2.
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subsidies and stated that if they had given a different interpre-
tation, the raison d'etre of Footnote 5 would be called into ques-
tion. 3°
The Panel also stated that Brazilian measures, which were
designed to match Bombardier subsidies of a similar nature
were still GATT-illegal. 131 The Panel found that developing
countries could not use the first paragraph of item (k) of the Il-
lustrative List to meet developed country competition and stated
that if a developing country encountered an export credit it
could not meet, while still respecting its obligations in the SCM
Agreement, the proper avenue of challenge was the DSB.132
On the same date, May 9, 2000, the decision of the Panel on
the challenged Canadian subsidies was released.1 33 This deci-
sion ruled on the issue of whether the changes made by Canada
to TPC and Canada Account had implemented the August 1999
Appellate Body decision complying with SCM Agreement obliga-
tions.' The Panel found that while Canada had complied with
the ruling regarding Canada Technology Partnerships,135
changes to the Canada Account program were insufficient.1
36
Canada Account merely issued a policy guideline that insured
that future Canada Account financing would be in accordance
with the OECD Arrangement. 137 The Panel did not find this sat-
isfactory, holding that Canada Account did not comply with the
interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement and there-
fore did not qualify for the "safe haven" of the second paragraph
of item (k) of Annex I to the SCM Agreement. 3 1 Interestingly,
the Panel declined Canada's request to endorse compliance veri-
fication procedures for the Canada Account program. 139 It gave
130. WT/DS46/RW, supra note 118, para. 6.41.
131. Id. para. 6.98.
132. Id. para. 6.107.
133. WTO Dispute Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/RW (May 9, 2000), reprinted in 8 INT'L TRADE REP. 9 (2000),
available at http://www.wto.org and 2000 WL 668958 [hereinafter WT/DS70/RW].
134. Id.
135. WT/DS70/AB/R, supra note 48, paras. 60-63. Canada significantly restruc-
tured the Canada Technology Partnership, including a modification of objectives, a
new definition of eligible activities, a reorientation of assessment criteria, enhanced
transparency, and a restructuring of risk and reward sharing. Id.
136. This involved issuance of a policy guideline that insured that future Can-
ada Account financing transactions would be in accordance with OECD Arrangement
on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits. Id.
137. WT/DS70/RW, supra note 133.
138. Id. Both CIRR and the other rules in the OECD Arrangement were found
to be relevant. Id.
139. Id.
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Canada ninety days to bring the Canada Account program into
compliance.
The government of Canada requested WTO authorization to
take countermeasures against Brazil in the amount of $700 mil-
lion (Can.) per year for seven years under Article 22.6 of the
DSU and initiated public consultations to hear public and in-
dustry concerns regarding retaliation. 141 The Canadian propos-
als for countermeasures were extensive and not limited to the
aircraft industry.1 12 They included a 100 percent surtax on se-
lected imports from Brazil in addition to any existing rates of
duty, suspension of Brazil from the list of countries eligible for
the General Preferential Tariff" treatment, and suspension of
injury inquiries under Canada's Special Import Measures Act in
countervailing duty investigations with respect to goods from
Brazil that benefit from PROEX subsidies. Canada not only
requested suspension of their obligations to Brazil under the
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, but also suspension
of Canada's obligations to Brazil under the WTO Agreement on
Import Licensing. 45  Several WTO members, including the
European Union, Malaysia, and Argentina, agreed publicly with
the Brazilian position that Canada should have waited for the
results of the pending Brazilian appeal before releasing its arbi-
146tration request for countermeasures.
Bombardier stated publicly that it had lost $10 billion (U.S.)
in sales and 25,000 person-years of work because of the Brazil-
ian subsidies and claimed that if those subsidies were not re-
moved soon, it would necessitate cutbacks at its Toronto plant.
4 1
Bombardier took the position that Canada should have asked
140. Id.
141. Communication from the Permanent Mission of Canada, Brazil - Export
Financing for Aircraft, WT/DS46/16 (May 11, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org
and 2000 WL 631038 [hereinafter WT/DS46/16].
142. Id.
143. The general preferential tariff is a unilateral tariff preference that Canada
grants for most imports from developing countries. CANADA CUSTOMS AND REVENUE
AGENCY, TARIFF TREATMENT - ORIGIN - IMPORTED GOODS, available at http:/
www.infoentrepreneurs.org/englishdisplay.cfm?code=1560&coll=FEFEDSBIS_E
(last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
144. WT/DS46/16, supra note 141.
145. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 15, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 1, avail-
able at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
146. Canada Pushes on Sanctions Against Brazil, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto),
May 23, 2000, at A6.
147. Heather Scoffield, Trade Attack Launched on Brazil, GLOBE AND MAIL (To-
ronto), May 10, 2000, at Bi.
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for the $10 billion (U.S.) in sanctions rather than the $4.9 billion
(U.S.) it actually asked for.141
In May of 2000, there were ongoing negotiations between
the two countries to try to avert a trade war, which some ex-
perts feared would damage trade with the whole region given
Brazil's heavyweight status at regional trade discussions. In
June of 2000, it appeared they had reached an agreement in
principle.' 5' The negotiations collapsed, however, as Brazil was
not ready to accede to the Canadian condition that new sales at
Embraer halt during the negotiations. 5'
On July 21, 2000, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that Bra-
zil had not brought the PROEX subsidy program into compli-
ance and that those subsidies continued to be illegal.152 The Ap-
pellate Body looked at the issue of whether PROEX bonds, 5'
granted by letter of commission before November 18, 1999, were
illegal and found that they were indeed prohibited by the SCM
Agreement, Section 3.1(a). 5 4 Brazil argued that because there
were certain letters of commitment outstanding for PROEX,
those subsidies had already been granted, but that argument
was again rejected.'55 The Appellate Body commented that the
lending institutions were often international institutions with-
out the "special costs" cited by Brazil as justification for
PROEX.1" Again, one of the most contentious issues was
whether the Illustrative List, item (k) paragraph 1 in Annex I of
the SCM Agreement, was intended to establish that anything
that did not fall within the scope of that section was a "permit-
ted" subsidy."' The Appellate Body found that those subsidies
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Joel Baglole & Christopher J. Chipello, Canada, Brazil Set Frame For
Trade Settlement, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2000, at A4, available at 2000 WL-WSJ
3034258.
151. Scoffield, supra note 147, at B1.
152. WTO Appellate Body, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/AB/RW (July 21, 2000), reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. 8, 26-29 (2000),
available at http://www.wto.org and 2000 WL 1011031 [hereinafter
WT/DS46/AB/RW]. Under the DSU, which refers in Article 26.5 to "these provi-
sions," Article 21.5 panel disputes can be appealed to the Appellate Body. Id. The
Appellate Body now had the dispute before it for the second time. Id.
153. The Appellate Body stated that these bonds were often granted over a fif-
teen year term (in this case, thirty payments over fifteen years). Id. They could be
held over their term or sold on the market at a discount. Id.
154. WT/DS46/AB/RW, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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were only justified under the first paragraph of (k) if the meas-
ure was not used to secure a material advantage in the field of
export credit terms.'58 The market benchmark was whether the
interest rate was at or above the CIRR rates or another appro-
priate benchmark."59 The Appellate Body found that Brazil had
the burden of proof and could not meet its burden.16 The Appel-
late Body rejected the two examples of similar rates in other
transactions cited by Brazil, stating that a single transaction
could not be considered a market benchmark.16 ' Because Brazil
failed to prove that PROEX was not used to secure a material
advantage in the field of export credit terms, it was unnecessary
to examine the second part of the test: whether the export sub-
sidies were all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or fi-
nancial institutions in obtaining credits within the meaning of
the first paragraph of item (k) of the Illustrative List.162 There-
fore, it held that the Panel's findings on that point were moot."
63
Having avoided the "permitted subsidies" issue, the Appellate
Body declined to comment on the meaning of Footnote 5 or the
items in the Illustrative List.1
4
At the same time, the Appellate Body confirmed that the
Technology Partnerships program of Canada was now in full
compliance with international trade obligations."' The Panel
declined to examine the changes to the Canadian TPC program
and whether the revised version was now in compliance with
the SCM Agreement." 6 The Appellate Body said that under Ar-
ticle 21.5 of the DSU, the Appellate Body may examine not only
whether the Panel decision had been implemented, but also
whether the new program was SCM Agreement-compliant.
167
Therefore, the new facts were relevant. The Appellate Body
found that the Panel had erred in declining to examine whether
158. Id. paras. 175-79.
159. WT/DS46/AB/RW, supra note 152.
160. Id.
161. Id. paras. 70-73. The transaction was also inapposite as it was guaranteed
by the government. Id. The other transaction Brazil cited was one involving Cana-
dian EDC export credits. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. para. 177.
164. Id.
165. WTO Appellate Body, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000) reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. 9, para.
1.3 (2000), available at http://www.wto.org and 2000 WL 1011030 [hereinafter
WT/DS70/AB/RW).
166. Id. paras. 12, 39.
167. Id. paras. 40-43.
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the revised Canadian TPC program was "specifically targeted"
to export under 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. 168 However, the
Appellate Body ruled that Brazil failed to demonstrate that
Canada's revised TPC program had not implemented the rec-
ommended changes or was inconsistent with the SCM Agree-
ment.'69 Brazil argued that because TPC listed "Aerospace" and
"Defense" as the only two sectors expressly identified, it was
specifically targeted to areas that were export oriented. 70 Brazil
relied on statements made by government officials, members of
Parliament, government ministers and TPC itself as evidence of
prohibited export contingency. 171 Brazil also mentioned the high
allocation of TPC funds, in practice, to export items as evidence
of specific targeting. 172 However, the Appellate Body rejected
this argument and stated that because there had been no trans-
actions under the "new" TPC, targeting could not be demon-
strated. The Appellate Body stated:
According to Brazil, sixty-five percent of TPC funding has, in past,
"gone to the [Canadian] aerospace industry." Brazil maintains that
the reason for these two types of targeting is the high export orienta-
tion of the industry. In this, Brazil relies upon a series of statements
made by Canadian Government Ministers, Members of Parliament,
other government officials, and by TPC itself.... In these proceedings,
we do not see the two "targeting factors", by themselves, as adequate
proof of prohibited export contingency... the evidence that Brazil relies
upon in seeking to demonstrate that the Canadian regional aircraft in-
dustry is "specifically targeted" because of its high export-orientation
relates to the TPC as previously constituted, not to the revised TPC
programme. ... Brazil has not offered any convincing evidence as to
why the evidence relating to the old TPC programme continues to be
relevant to the revised TPC programme. We do not believe we should
simply assume that this particular piece of evidence is relevant with
respect to the revised TPC programme.
The Appellate Body said that export orientation was not
enough to demonstrate a relationship of conditionality or de-
pendence of the subsidy to export performance. Export orienta-
tion can be a relevant fact, but not the only fact supporting a
finding of prohibited export contingency.
168. Id.
169. Id. paras. 47-55.
170. Id. para. 44.
171. WT/DS70/AB/RW, supra note 165, para. 45.
172. Id. para. 44.
173. Id. paras. 44-51.
174. Id. paras. 48-49.
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III. COUNTERMEASURES AND TRADE WARS
A. THE COUNTERMEASURE BATTLE
On August 28, 2000, the Arbitration Report was released
pursuant to DSU Article 22.6 regarding the quantum of retalia-
tion allowable.'75 Under Article 22.7, the arbitrators were not to
examine the nature of the concessions or other obligations to be
suspended, but were to determine whether the level of such sus-
pension was equivalent to the level of nullification or impair-
ment of benefits.176  The arbitrators held that $344.2 million
(Can.) per year for six years in countermeasures could be taken
by Canada against Brazil. 77 While this was only a portion of
what Canada had requested, it still was one of the highest
amounts ever authorized by the WTO for retaliation.'7 7 The Ar-
bitrators found that Brazil, as the challenger of the countermea-
sures, had the burden of proof.78 Brazil, stating it was not in a
position to provide information on the issue, accepted the "unit
price" of each model of Embraer's regional jets proposed by Can-
ada. 8° The Arbitrators made a point of stating that protection of
confidential information was crucial to the co-operation of mem-
bers and private parties and provided two versions of the re-
ports, one for all member states of the WTO and a version with
more sensitive information for the parties' eyes alone.''
Brazil also tried to argue that because there had been an
agreement between the parties earlier and the time to propose
countermeasures under the agreement had expired, Canada had~182
no authority to propose countermeasures. The Arbitrators,
however, referred to the fact that no time limit was specified in
Article 22.6 of the DSU.'
83
One of the most interesting portions of the Arbitration Re-
175. Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Air-
craft, WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org and 2000 WL
1251329 [hereinafter WT/DS46/ARB].
176. Final Act, supra note 2, at art. 22.7.
177. WT/DS46/ARB, supra note 175. This is the equivalent of $233.5 million
(U.S.).
178. Heather Scoffield, Canada's Brazil Sanction Level Slashed, GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 23, 2000, at B1.
179. WT/DS46/ARB, supra note 175, para. 2.8.
180. Id.
181. Id. para. 2.14.
182. WTO Bilateral Agreement, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Air-
craft, WT/DS46/13 (Nov. 23, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org.
183. WT/DS46/ARB, supra note 175, para. 3.6.
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port concerned the method of calculation of the subsidy. Brazil
argued that the calculation of countermeasures must include a
direct comparison of the types of aircraft involved. It specifi-
cally argued that because there were no thirty-seven seat jets
built in Canada, subsidies for those transactions should not be
included in the calculation.' Brazil said that, therefore, the
calculation should not include the full amounts of payments un-
der PROEX, but only those which secure a material advantage
and produce verifiable nullification or impairment. 85 The ques-
tion of nullification or impairment was examined by the Arbitra-
tors when deciding the amount of countermeasures in a differ-
ent context when deciding whether there has been breach of a
covered agreement.1
86
The question the Arbitrators had to decide was, when calcu-
lating countermeasures under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement
and the DSU, whether the calculation should ensure that the
amount is equivalent to the level of nullification or impair-
ment.'" The Arbitrators examined this issue carefully but re-
jected the Brazilian argument, finding that "appropriate" coun-
termeasures under Section 4 of the SCM Agreement meant
measures that effectively induce compliance.'88 The Arbitrators
stated that a violation of Section 3 of the SCM Agreement cre-
ated an irrefutable presumption of nullification or impair-
ment.'89 They rejected an argument based upon footnotes 9 and
10 of the SCM Agreement, which identically state, "This expres-
sion is not meant to allow countermeasures that are dispropor-
tionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under
these provisions are prohibited.'190 Brazil argued that counter-
measures based upon the full amount of the subsidy, which do
not take into account the number of sales of aircraft with re-
spect to which Canada suffers nullification or impairment,
would be disproportionate.' The Arbitrators specified that they
did not draw any firm conclusion as to the meaning of footnotes
9 and 10 of the SCM Agreement.'9 2 The Arbitrators stated that
184. Id. para. 3.61.
185. Id.
186. Id. paras. 3.54-3.60.
187. Id. para. 3.44.
188. Referring to an identical definition of that term by the Bananas panel. Id.
paras. 3.44-3.49.
189. WT/DS46/ARB, supra note 175, para. 3.48.
190. Id. paras. 3.50-3.54.
191. Id. para. 3.59.
192. Id. para. 3.51.
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in the context of the obligation to withdraw a measure that vio-
lated a covered agreement, countermeasures need not be based
only on the level of nullification or impairment.9 3 Rather, induc-
ing compliance with WTO obligations is the paramount con-
cern.'94 The problem with the Arbitrators' holding is that if such
an irrefutable presumption of nullification or impairment exists
under Section 3, then it is unclear what the reference to "dis-
proportionate" could mean and if or how any a party must dem-
onstrate that a proposed countermeasure would be dispropor-
tionate. 9'5
Brazil also argued that since Canada chose to apply coun-
termeasures, it could not ask for those countermeasures in the
amount of the subsidy, since Article 22.4 of the DSU limits
countermeasures to the amount of the nullification or impair-
ment. 196 Rejecting that argument, the Arbitrators ruled that the
total amount of the PROEX payments should be used to deter-
mine the countermeasures.197 Issues such as which types of air-
craft were in competition were held to be irrelevant to the coun-
termeasures taken in response to the original trade-distorting
measure. 99 They stated,
Actually, given that export subsidies usually operate with a multiply-
ing effect (a given amount allows a company to make a number of
sales, thus gaining a foothold in a given market with the possibility to
expand and gain market shares), we are of the view that a calculation
based upon the level of nullification or impairment would, as suggested
by the calculations of Canada based upon the harm caused to its in-
dustry, produce higher figures than one based exclusively on the
amount of the subsidy. On the other hand, if the actual level of nullifi-
cation or impairment is substantially lower than the subsidy, a coun-
termeasure based on the actual level of nullification or impairment
will have less or no inducement effect and the subsidizing country may
not withdraw the measure at issue.1
99
Countermeasures need to be tied to the amount of nullifica-
tion and impairment and to be specifically tied to the industry
at issue if the SCM Agreement are to be effective. 200 Although
Article 22.3(a) directs a party seeking to impose countermea-
sures to consider the general principle that if possible they
193. Id. para. 3.58.
194. Id. para. 3.54
195. WT/DS46/ARB, supra note 175 (regarding arbitrators' discussion).
196. Id. para. 3.53.
197. Id.
198. Id. paras. 3.54, 3.62.
199. Id.
200. Final Act, supra note 2, at art. 22, at Annex 2.
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should be directed to the same sector as that against which a
violation has been found, subsection (b) allows that party to di-
rect it towards other sectors and in subsection (c) towards other
covered agreements if the party considers the other options not
practical or effective. °1 Under Article 22.3(e), the parties needJ - 202
merely state the reasons therefore. The Arbitrators stated
that Brazil had the burden of proof to make a prima facie case
"presumption" why the proposed countermeasures were inap-
propriate and then Canada had the burden to rebut that "pre-
sumption.'2 °3
Canada continued to take the position that Brazil's claims
that Brazil was in compliance were no more than "a unilateral
assertion" and awaited clearance from the DSB to move forward
with sanctions. It received this clearance on December 12,
2000.204 Despite receiving formal permission to retaliate for the
continued use of PROEX, Canada had yet to decide on specific
retaliatory measures to be imposed, only citing the $344.2 mil-
lion (Can.) per year they were allowed to impose by the Panel.205
In December 2000, Brazil announced that the country would
start using the CIRR issued monthly by the Paris-based Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development to set its
level of support for Embraer. °6 Numerous meetings took place
between Canada and Brazil to discuss Brazil's implementation
207
of the WTO ruling in order to avoid retaliation. we
successful and Canada's image in Brazil became that of a First
World country trying to keep Brazil from exporting hi-tech
products, forcing it to export only low-technology items such as
coffee beans. °s
201. Id. at art. 22.3.
202. Id. at art. 22.3(e).
203. WTfDS46/ARB, supra note 175, para. 2.8.
204. Annette Hester, There's a Reason to Beef about Ottawa's Brazil Policy,
GLOBE AND MML (Toronto), Feb. 19, 2001, at A13. The request by Canada can be
found at Communication from the Permanent Mission of Canada, Brazil - Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/25 (Dec. 1, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org and 2000 WL 1772298 [hereinafter WT/DS46/251. The minutes
of the meeting are available at Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/MI94 (Feb. 15, 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
205. WT/DS46/25, supra note 204.
206. Michael Marray, Locked Horns, AIRFIN. J. (May 2001), available at
www.airfinancejournal.com.
207. Id.
208. MacKinnon, supra note 9.
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B. TOWARD A TRADE WAR
In January of 2001, Brazil's Agriculture Minister Marcus de
Pratini Morales said that his country might boycott Canadian
potassium chloride, a chemical fertilizer, and possibly other ag-
ricultural products if Canada pressed ahead with sanctions. He
stated, "A retaliation will be worse for Canada than for us. The
farming sector will be the first to respond, as everything Brazil
imports from Canada in this sector can be substituted."2 9 Agri-
cultural exports to Brazil, including potassium chloride, are
worth over $400 million (U.S.) annually.210 Predictably, Can-
ada's importers of Brazilian footwear, steel, and coffee claimed
that consumer prices would increase, that some products would
disappear from the market, and that they were being held hos-
tage when they had nothing to do with aircraft 21
In February 2001, Canada announced that it was returning
212to the WTO for another ruling on Brazil's non-compliance,
which Brazil used procedural objections to temporarily block.213
Brazil also announced it would challenge the Canadian move to
provide $2 billion (U.S.) in cut-rate loan guarantees to Bombar-
dier through the Canada Account to help it secure a 150-jet con-
tract with Air Wisconsin, an affiliate of United Airlines. 4 The
Canadian Industry Minister, Brian Tobin, declared that such
assistance was a necessary response to continued Brazilian sub-
sidies.21 5 Brazil also announced that it was preparing a number
of legal arguments to prevent the same panel that issued a deci-
209. Mark MacKinnon, Brazil, Canada Edge Closer to Trade War, GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 24, 2001, at B5.
210. Id.
211. Mark MacKinnon & Shawn McCarthy, Diplomats Talk Tough on Trade
with Brazil, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 1, 2001, at B3 (repeating remarks by
Bob Armstrong, President of the Canadian Association of Importers and Exporters).
212. Mark MacKinnon & Shawn MacCarthy, Canada Returns to WTO for Brazil
Subsidy Ruling, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 1, 2001, at B3. Canada sought the
ruling at Communication from the Permanent Mission of Canada to Article 21.5 of
the DSU, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/26 (Jan. 22,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org and 2001 WL 63037. The matter was also
referred to the original panel by the DSB, Communication by the Secretariat, Brazil
- Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/27 (Feb. 22, 2002), available
at http://www.wto.org and 2001 WL 175277 [hereinafter WT/DS46/27].
213. Press Release, Brazil Blocks Canada's Request for a WTO Ruling on Brazil-
ian Aircraft Subsidy, Feb. 1, 2001, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/aircraft-
e.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
214. Bombardier, Brasil pedira panel na OMC, Feb. 21, 2001, at http://www.
estadao.com.br/agestado/.
215. MacKinnon, supra note 9.
2003]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
216
sion on the previous cases from hearing the new case. 6 The top
Brazilian trade negotiator, Jose Alfredo Graca Lima, told the
press in February 2001 that Canada's sole goal was the elimina-
tion of PROEX, but that Brazil sees the program as necessary to
level the playing field between developing and developed coun-
217tries. 
Embraer's vice-president of external relations, Henrique
Rzezinski, told the press that Canada was into the subsidy game
as much as Brazil, but doing it much more quietly. He alleged
Canada subsidized through the Economic Development Corpo-
ration (EDC), which does not have to report to whom it loans
money and what conditions are imposed. 218 He also charged
Canada with hypocritical "imperialism," in that a developed
country trying to deny a developing country the tools it once
used itself to achieve success. 219 Rzezinski pointed to the fact
that Canada had not taken the European Union or the United
States to the WTO over agricultural subsidies, stating that the
message being sent was that Brazil exports coffee beans and
Canada exports airplanes, and that is the way it should stay.22°
Embraer's president, Mauricio Botelho, described the WTO
ruling as an "absolutely unjust" application of a double stan-
dard, "one for developing countries and another for advanced
countries," and accused Bombardier of attempting to crush com-
petition. 221 Botelho also pointed out that "we continue to rack up
sales at a record rate," and indeed, Canada intends for Embraer
to move into the bottom end of the full-size jet market, with
plans for ninety-eight and one-hundred eight seat versions of its
regional jets.222 Embraer urged some of its U.S., Japanese, and
European suppliers to open up factories in Brazil and several
have committed to do So.223 Mr. Botelho was confident of Em-
braer's future, stating, "we're not going to deviate from the vi-
sion that brought us this far."224 However, there are those that
doubt that privatization under Mr. Botelho's leadership was the
key to Embraer's success, including the first president of Em-
216. Brazil Thwarts Canada's WTO Move, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 2,
2001, at B5.
217. McKinnon & McCarthy, supra note 212.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Rohter, supra note 34.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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braer, Ozires Silva, now head of Varig Airlines. Silva stated
that,
Nowhere in the world can enterprise of this sort be built or meet with
success without orders from the government or the military. The mili-
tary always wants to be in the lead in technology, so it covers the costs,
and the civilian sector is in the end the big beneficiary. The develop-
ment of the Internet was like that, and our situation is no different.
2 2
Because Embraer was such a symbol of Brazilian hopes,
public anger in Brazil went far beyond politicians, to ranchers
and restaurateurs for whom Canada was now an enemy. Brazil-
ian dock workers threatened to refuse Canadian cargoes and ra-
dio show hosts barred Canadian music. 26 The anger in Brazil
was further fueled by the 2001 Canadian ban on Brazilian beef
on "mad cow disease" grounds, which was seen merely as a pre-
text to harm Brazil over the jet subsidy issue.227 It appears that
the Brazilians were correct, for there was little scientific data
that Canada could produce to justify its actions.228
The beef ban created a furor in Brazil. There were allega-
tions by Canadian scientists to the press that they, themselves,
had not even been consulted on the beef ban and a Health Can-
ada scientist was suspended for speaking out publicly.229 Free
trade partners, the United States and Mexico, were obligated to
follow the ban, which was imposed upon the grounds of "theo-
retical risk" of mad cow disease. 230 Both the United States and
Mexico decided to reconsider the ban given the lack of a single
case of mad cow disease in Brazil.2 31 Angry Brazilian officials,
stating that there had never been a case of mad cow disease
documented in Brazil, vowed that if Canada did not cease the
22measures immediately, it would start a large trade war.Products said to be on Brazil's list for retaliatory suspension
225. Id.
226. Reese Ewing, Canada-Brazil Firms Demand Immediate End to Beef Ban,
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 16, 2001, at B1; see also Mark MacKinnon, Scien-
tists Rip Mad-Cow 'Ruse,' GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 9, 2001, at Al.
227. Mark MacKinnon, Mad-Cow Ban on Brazil a 'Ruse,' Scientists Say, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 9, 2001, at Al.
228. Id.
229. Keith McArthur, Ottawa Scientist Suspended, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto),
Feb. 21, 2001, at A6.
230. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 756, 32 I.L.M.
605.
231. Mark MacKinnon, Brazil Turns Up the Heat over Canada's Beef Ban on
Monday, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 8, 2001, at B1.
232. Id.
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were worth about $300 million (U.S.) a year. 33 Brazil also
moved toward suspending all trade agreements with Canada
until the beef ban was lifted."3 4 A resolution to that effect was
unanimously approved by the Brazilian Congress and went to
the executive branch for approval. 235 There was concern that
Canada's trade and investment cooperation agreement with
Brazil and other South American countries, a precursor to a free
trade deal, might be affected.236 However, Canada refused to lift
the ban and said that it would wait for the findings of food in-
spectors, despite a threat by President Cardoso on February 9,
2001, stating that if Canada did not lift the ban in three weeks,
Brazil would retaliate, complain to the WTO, and abandon talks
on free trade scheduled for the Summit of the Americas in
spring of 2001.237 Brazil was also vocal about its view that the
existing trade pacts did not adequately address the needs of the
developing world. 38
During this period of escalating hostility over regional jets,
Canada requested yet another panel review of the revised
PROEX.239 At the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in
April 2001, Brazil and several smaller nations blocked proposals
for moving the completion of the FTAA negotiations up to
2003.240 The ministers settled instead on reducing the schedule
for talks by one year."'
The hostile Brazilian reaction to this perceived threat to na-
tional sovereignty was not without some irony, given the enor-
mous level of financial support, over $40 billion (U.S.), that Bra-
zil has received through the International Monetary Fund and
other sources over the last few years.242 Clearly, Brazil wishes
this economic support to continue, but views attempts to regu-
late trade practices through international organizations such as
the WTO as an intrusion on Brazilian sovereignty and arouse
233. Mark MacKinnon, Brazil May Retaliate for Canadian Beef Ban, GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 7, 2001, at A7.
234. MacKinnon, supra note 231.
235. Id.
236. Id.; Mark MacKinnon, Beef Ban Could End as Brazil Talks Tough, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 10, 2001, at Al.
237. MacKinnon,supra note 231.
238. Id.
239. WT/DS46/27, supra note 212.
240. FTAA Talks Show Impact of Anti-Trade Demonstrations, WASH. TARIFF &
TRADE, Apr. 16, 2001, at 1, available at http://wttlonline.com.
241. Id.
242. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BRAZIL: COMPOSITION OF THE SUPPORT
PACKAGE, at http://www.imf.org/external/exr/facts/brazil/htm (Nov. 17, 1998).
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• 243much passionate anger in Brazil .
As for Bombardier, its problems with Embraer did not pre-
vent it from recently winning a contract with Mesa Air Group of
Phoenix worth $1.2 billion (U.S.) with options for another forty
aircraft worth more than $1 billion (U.S.). 44 Subsequently, on
April 16, 2001, Bombardier announced that it had closed a deal
to sell up to seventy-five jets to Air Wisconsin, carrying a $2.35
billion (U.S.) price tag.245 The deal was supported by loan guar-
antees from the Canadian federal government.246  Bombardier
asked Canada for federal funding enabling it to land a $1.5 bil-
lion (U.S.) order for sixty to seventy-five jets with Northwest
Airlines.24 7 Correspondingly, Prime Minister Chretien said pub-
licly that Canada would "fight fire with fire" in the battle with
Brazil for regional aircraft market share.248
Brazil responded to this by requesting the establishment of
a DSU panel on the issue of the Bombardier subsidies.249 In
July 2001, a panel ruling in Canada's case against Brazil found
that PROEX was not per se illegal as long as financing was at
market rates plus a premium for risk, loans were for no longer
than ten years, and the loans did not cover more than eighty-
five percent of the purchase price.250  The Article 21.5 Panel
found that since Brazil claimed that PROEX III payments would
conform in practice to the OECD Arrangement and use CIRR as
a minimum, it was not used to confer a material advantage in
the field of export terms. The panel held that in any event the
program was justified under paragraph 2 of item (k) of the Illus-
trative List but not under paragraph 1 as an affirmative de-
fense.25' With this determination, both Brazil and Canada
243. Ewing, supra note 226.
244. Keith McArthur, Bombardier Wins Jet Contract, GLOBE AND MAIL (To-
ronto), Mar. 22, 2001, at B8.
245. Keith McArthur, Bombardier Deal Will Add 10,00 Jobs, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), Apr. 17, 2001, at Al.
246. Id.
247. Keith McArthur, Bombardier Asks Ottawa for Help in Landing Jet Deal,
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), May 23, 2001, at B3.
248. Mark MacKinnon, PM Vows to 'Fight Fire with Fire' in Trade Disputes,
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), May 30, 2001, at B3.
249. WTO Panel Report, Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Re-
gional Aircraft, WT/DS222/2 (Mar. 1, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org [herein-
after WT/DS222/2].
250. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42.
251. Id. Even though there was flexibility on the part of the Brazilian govern-
ment regarding the rate, the panel found that there was no breach since the pro-
gram did not require Brazil to act inconsistently with its obligations under the SCM
Agreement. Id. The panel decision was adopted by the DSB. WTO Dispute Panel
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claimed victory in the panel ruling.252
Afterward, the dispute between Brazil and Canada contin-
ued to move in a bizarre direction. In July of 2001, Brazil
moved to ban Canadian beef on mad cow disease grounds.254
This was widely seen as mere retaliation over the jet contro-
versy and Canada's ban of Brazilian beef.2" Days later, Bom-
bardier announced that it had won a $1.68 billion (U.S.) contract
with Northwest Airlines, with a government loan package of up
to $1.2 billion (U.S.), eighty percent of the purchase price, with afiften ear oan • 1256
fifteen year loan period. Canada said it was merely matching
illegal subsidies by Brazil and that Brazil would therefore have
no grounds to retaliate, although some government officials ask-
ing not to be named, confided their doubts to the press.257 With
this action, Canada was clearly ignoring the comments of the
Appellate Body in 1999 and the May 2000 Panel, which made it
plain that there could be no "matching" of GATT-illegal subsi-
dies with other GATT-illegal subsidies.5 s
Meanwhile, Brazil proceeded with the case it filed in March
2001, alleging subsidies through the Canada Account, TPC and
the Province of Quebec.259 On October 25, 2001, an interim re-
port found that the $1.1 billion (U.S.) in financing provided by
Canada was an illegal subsidy. 0 Despite the ruling, Canada
said it would go ahead with the assistance on the Air Wisconsin
sale."' In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
Bombardier intensified its efforts to seek financing, meeting
Settlement Body, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/29
(Aug. 28, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
252. Heather Scoffield, Canada Won't Appeal Brazil Subsidies, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), Aug. 24, 2001, at B3.
253. Colin Freeze, Brazil Slaps Import Ban on Canadian, U.S. Cattle, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Toronto), July 3, 2001, at A4.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Keith MacArthur, Ottawa Saves Millions for Northwest, GLOBE AND MAL
(Toronto), July 11, 2001, at B3.
257. Mark MacKinnon, Ottawa Admits Subsidies in Grey Area, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), July 27, 2001, at B5.
258. WS/DS46/13, supra note 115, para. 6.107.
259. WTO Panel Report, Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Re-
gional Aircraft, WT/DS222I2 (Mar. 1, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org.
260. Daniel Pruzin & Peter Meyasz, WTO Decision Puts Pressure on Brazil,
Canada to Resolve Aircraft Subsidy Dispute, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 1706, 1706 (2001).
261. Heather Scoffield & Steven Chase, Ottawa Braces for WTO Defeat Trade
Body to Issue Ruling on Whether Loans Supporting Bombardier Are Wrong, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 18, 2001, at B1.
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with both the Canadian and British governments.262 At the No-
vember 2001 WTO meeting in Doha, the governments of Canada
and Brazil agreed to meet to attempt to resolve the subsidy dis-
pute. 63 After a meeting on November 22, 2001, which did not
provide a breakthrough, Brazil's chief negotiator told the press
that he expected the October WTO final Panel Report to be the
"trump card" in the hands of Brazil's team when negotiations
resumed in January 2002.264 However, the final Panel Report
was not released to the parties until January 28, 2002.265 While
Brazil failed to prove prohibited export subsidies had been given
in several cases or that the programs were illegal per se or "as
applied," the Panel did find that the $1.7 billion (Can.) EDC
Canada Account financing for Air Wisconsin, as well as EDC fi-
nancing for Air Nostrum and Comair, were illegal. 66
The Panel rejected Canada's contention that the OECD Ar-
rangement permitted matching under Article 29 and Articles 25
and 31 of Annex 111.2617 Some of the Panel's reasoning was based
upon the difficulties of allowing unsupervised subsidy matching,
noting that the parties would have often not known the terms
and conditions they were entitled to match.268 However, the
Panel did respond to Canada's argument that the WTO system
was set up only for prospective remedies and stated that the
Australia-Leather-Article 21.5 Panel suggested that there is
room in the DSU to allow for retrospective remedies in the form
of repayment in certain instances.2 69 The Panel noted that Arti-
cle 23.1 of the DSU provides for dispute settlement through the
DSU and thus prohibits unilateral self-help.27° The Panel also
262. Bertrand Marotte, Bombardier Seeks Aid to Sell Jets to Airlines, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 26, 2001, at B1.
263. Aircraft Subsidy Talks on November 22, Pettigrew Says, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), Nov. 14, 2001, at B7.
264. Id.
265. Ed Taylor, Brazil, Canada Continue WTO Discussions on Dispute over Re-
gional Plane Subsidies, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 1914, 1915 (2001). The report was due
to be circulated to the parties in late January 2001. See also WTO Dispute Panel
Report, Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft Com-
munication from the Chairman of the Panel, WT/DS222/5 (Dec. 18, 2002), available
at http://www/wto.org [hereinafter WT/DS222/51.
266. Taylor, supra note 265.
267. WT/DS222/5, supra note 265, para. 7.174.
268. Id.
269. Id. para. 7.170. See also WTO Dispute Panel, Australia - Subsidies Pro-
vided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, WT/DS126/RW, reprinted
in 4 INT'L TRADE LAw REP. 1382 (2000) (Jan. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2002) [hereinafter WT/DS126/RWI.
270. WT/DS222/5, supra note 265.
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said that the OECD Arrangement was a "gentleman's agree-
ment," whereas the SCM Agreement, being a binding obligation,
did not need matching provisions to instill discipline.27'
Given the history of this particular case, this statement by
the Panel is somewhat ironic. Canada perhaps did not improve
matters when on the same day the Panel Ruling was released,
Canadian Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew told the press that
the decision's silver lining was that it gave Brazil a partial win
and that a proud people like the Brazilians needed a WTO win
before they could sit down and negotiate a settlement.272 Petti-
grew told the press that although he was going to make at-
tempts to settle, Canada had not decided whether to appeal.273
Talks were set to resume February 8, 2002, in New York.
Though the matter has not yet been resolved, Canada an-
nounced in February 2002, that it would not appeal the WTO
ruling on the Bombardier subsidies.274 Furthermore, Canada
and Brazil continued to negotiate throughout the summer and
autumn of 2002, while awaiting a ruling on Brazilian retalia-
tion, but have been unable to reach a settlement.275
IV. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE PROBLEMS
ILLUMINATED BY THE JET DISPUTE
The trade war over regional jets between Canada and Bra-
zil has required the DSB to attempt to clarify many provisions
of the SCM Agreement and the DSU, but it has also served to
highlight many of the dramatic difficulties in WTO dispute reso-
lution. Fortunately, the regional jet example also suggests ways
that the WTO can improve the process and in so doing, preserve
its authority and progress toward an effective adjudicatory
model. The importance of doing so should be self-evident as
many world economies struggle in recession and higher-profile
trade disputes over such items as steel tariffs dominate head-
lines.276
The first issue illuminated by this dispute is the issue of
271. Id. para. 7.176.
272. Steven Chase, Pettigrew Sees Silver Lining in WTO Loss, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), Jan. 28, 2002, at B1.
273. Id.
274. Ottawa Won't Appeal WTO Ruling on Jet Sales, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto),
Feb. 19, 2002, at B5.
275. Sandra Cordon, Brazil, Canada Continue Talks to Resolve Dispute over Air-
craft Sales, CAN. PRESS, July 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 23890893.
276. See generally supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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what is an appropriate benchmark to determine whether mate-
rial advantage has been conferred.27' Brazil argued, unsuccess-
fully, that "Brazil Risk" increased the cost of financing and ne-
cessitated unusually complex financing structures for aircraft
transactions. 278 Therefore, a determination of what is appropri-
ate under item (k) of the Illustrative List must account for such
added cost.279 Canada has thus far prevailed in its position that
only the CIRR of the OECD Arrangement is an appropriate
benchmark, although the Panel and Appellate Bodies stopped
short of finding that it was an immutable test.28°
The logical conclusion is that the CIRR of the OECD Ar-
rangement is, in reality, usually the determinative test to decide
whether a GATT - illegal subsidy has been given.28' Such a
benchmark, set monthly, is the most realistic option for these
types of loans, which often have ten-year terms.282 Member
states may attempt to offer evidence of other transactions made
at lower than CIRR rates, however, one or two transactions will
not suffice to establish a market benchmark.2 2 More problem-
atic from the point of view of developing countries like Brazil is
that they are not OECD members and did not participate in the
OECD Arrangement, which is not a formal Act, but is referred to
by the OECD itself as a "gentlemen's agreement."284 The lack of
transparency of the OECD was a sore point with Brazil.2 5 If
such member states do not wish to follow the CIRR benchmark
and other relevant provisions of the Arrangement, they must
initiate discussion about changing the SCM Agreement to incor-
porate an alternative benchmark that has the flexibility of the
CIRR.288
Many export credit agencies in developing countries have
277. WT/DS46/AB/R, supra note 89; see also supra note 98 and accompanying
text.
278. MacKinnon, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
281. WT/DS46/AB/R, supra note 89, para. 181; see also supra note 98 and ac-
companying text.
282. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, para. 4.115.
283. WT/DS46/AB/RW, supra note 152, paras. 70-73; see also supra note 161 and
accompanying text.
284. WT/DS222/5, supra note 265, para. 7.176; see also Overview of the OECD:
What is it? History? Structure of the Organization?, at http://www.oecd.org (last vis-
ited Oct 9, 2002).
285. WT/DS70/ABIR, supra note 48, para. 214-16; see also supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
286. WTIDS46/AB/RW, supra note 152, para. 80.
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used the London Interbank Overnight Rate (LIBOR) as a refer-
ence. 287 Alternatively, they could negotiate with OECD member
nations to obtain some input into, and transparency of, the deci-
sion-making process of the Arrangement, possibly even incorpo-
rating some provision to deal with the problem that, in the jets
dispute, was termed "Brazil risk" premium.288 If the WTO
avoids dealing with this issue, it would only widen the gulf be-
tween developing and developed member states, giving develop-
ing member states the perception that they are "second-class"
members of the WTO.2 9
A second area with serious flaws is the calculation and ap-
plication of countermeasures.2 9 0  The decision on retaliatory
measures to be taken by Canada demonstrated that in the cal-
culation of countermeasures, the level of nullification or im-
pairment to the complaining party will not necessarily deter-
mine the level of the countermeasures. 91  Instead, the
benchmark is what will have an "inducing effect" and this, being
somewhat vague and rarely effective, requires some clarifica-
tion.292 In this dispute, even though the amount of the counter-
measures was very large and were to be spread across many in-
dustries, it has not had such an "inducing effect."2 93 The only
effect that has been produced is further political tension be-
tween Canada and Brazil and between developed nations and
developing member states.294 A more pragmatic solution to this
problem needs to be proposed.
One possible solution is that such countermeasures be tied
to the level of nullification or impairment and should be directed
toward the industry involved in the dispute.295 Therefore, Arti-
cle 22.3(a) of the DSU either needs a stricter interpretation of
its "general principle" of directing countermeasures toward the
same industry, or Article 22 needs to be reformed so that the
burden is placed on the party seeking countermeasures to show
287. Chakravarthi Raghaven, DSB Adopts Brazil - Canada Compliance Panel
Reports (Aug. 4, 2000), at http://www.twnside.org.sgltitle /canada.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2002).
288. WT/DS222/5, supra note 265, para. 7.176
289. MacKinnon, supra note 9.
290. See WT/DS46/16, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
291. See WT/DS46/ARB, supra note 175, paras. 3.54-3.60.
292. Id.
293. WT/DS70/2, supra note 53.
294. See supra note 253, 272 and accompanying text.
295. Final Act, supra note 2, at art. 22, at Annex 2; but see WT/DS46/ARB, supra
note 175, para. 20 (claiming that a countermeasure based on the actual level of nul-
lification or impairment will have less or no inducement effect).
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that it is impracticable to direct countermeasures toward that
industry.296 Additionally, a mechanism is needed whereby, if as
here a member cannot place tariffs on products in the same in-
dustry because the injured member does not import those prod-
ucts, it can direct an amount of subsidy, which matches the ille-
gal subsidy to the injured member's main industry with DSB• • 297
supervision. Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement would need
to be amended to outline such a mechanism. 298 The intended ef-
fect would be to neutralize the original subsidy and thus en-
courage the complete removal of such subsidy programs.
If such supervised subsidy matching had been part of the
process, it might have ended the dispute between Canada and
Brazil at an early stage.299 When analyzing the viability of such
a program, it is important to consider that a member with an
important, heavily subsidized industry may choose, when faced
with countermeasures, to absorb the blow rather than comply-
ing with a ruling.00 A member state is likely to continue to sub-
sidize the industry when the state perceives the industry as sig-
nificant to its national interests.30' This may be true even when
the amount of the countermeasures is very large.0 2 Industries
unrelated to the exports that are the subject matter of the dis-
pute will then suffer the ultimate consequences. 30 3 A Brazilian
manufacturer of footwear may suffer the consequences of re-
taliatory measures, rather than Embraer . 304 A DSB supervised,
subsidy-matching program would be one way to discourage this
behavior and lessen the trade distorting effect on unrelated in-
dustries.35 The creation and supervision of such a mechanism,
while it would involve a more hands-on approach than the DSB
has traditionally favored, is the best way to neutralize a situa-
296. WT/DS46/ARB, supra note 175, para. 2.14; see also supra note 181 and ac-
companying text.
297. See WT/DS46/ARB, supra note 175 (allowing extensive countermeasures
not limited to the aircraft industry).
298. Id.
299. See Baglole & Chipello, supra note 150, at A4 (showing that the parties
were nearly in agreement before countermeasures were allowed).
300. See McArthur, supra note 247 (illustrating that Bombardier continued to
use financing backed by the Canadian government); see also Scoffield & Chase, su-
pra note 261.
301. See McArthur, supra note 247; see also Scoffield & Chase, supra note 261.
302. WT/DS46/ARB, supra note 175 (allowing for $233.5 million (U.S.) in coun-
termeasures).
303. See MacKinnon, supra note 209 and accompanying text.
304. See MacKinnon & McCarthy, supra note 211 and accompanying text.
305. WT/DS222/5, supra note 265, para. 7.174; see also supra note 268 and ac-
companying text.
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tion where member states might otherwise compete with esca-
lating levels of subsidization. Enactment of this mechanism
would encourage compliance of both developed and developing
countries. °6 It would also force member states to compete by at-
tempting to develop superior product.3 7
Third, it has become obvious that Article 27 of the SCM
Agreement, which attempts to mitigate potential deleterious ef-
fects of the Agreement on developing nations, will be construed
fairly narrowly.308 This is shown by the Panel's finding that
Brazil's failure to phase-out its subsidy levels, having committed
itself to issue new bonds after the end of the transition period,
meant that it was not shielded by the SCM Agreement 27 excep-
tion.30 9 Brazil failed in its claim that the subsidy level at the
date of creation of PROEX, 1991, was the appropriate bench-
mark for determining whether those levels had been increased.
The Panel instead found that the date preceding enactment of
the WTO Agreement was the relevant date.310 The Panel also
rejected the Brazilian argument that the subsidies were granted
when the bonds, some of which were to be issued after the end of
the transition period, were issued.311 This was probably an ap-
propriate result since any precedent set with a less than strict
interpretation of the developing country exception would only
encourage developing countries to continue subsidizing and pro-
long dependency on those subsidies.312
While this strict interpretation may correctly lessen the
significant developing country dependence on such subsidies, it
may produce tension.3 3 After having negotiated for Article 27
phase-out relief for domestic political purposes, developing
member states now found that Article 27 was not the hoped for
escape hatch."1 4 Developing nations have issues, which tend to
be politically sensitive such as "Brazil Risk," that they feel are
not adequately addressed by the SCM Agreement, which tend to
306. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (showing that currently Canada
and Brazil compete on economic factors such as subsidies and labor costs).
308. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, paras. 7.83-7.85, 7.87-7.93 and accompanying
text. See also WT/DS46/AB/R, supra note 89, para. 196(b) and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
310. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, para. 7.61.
311. Id. para. 7.62.
312. Id.
313. WT/DS46/AB/R, supra note 89; see also supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
314. Final Act, supra note 2, at art. 27.4.
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be politically sensitive. 3 5 A failure to resolve the problem satis-
factorily within the system will further exacerbate the current
reluctance of many developing countries to move toward elimi-
nation of trade barriers.1 6 In the jet dispute, Brazil clearly be-
lieves that it cannot compete effectively with Bombardier be-
cause of its lower cost of financing and alleged secretive subsidy
programs, without implementing subsidy programs that violate
the SCM Agreement. 17 Supervised subsidy matching and de-
veloping country participation in the setting of the export credit
financing benchmark will encourage developing countries to be-
lieve that instead of having to "level the playing field" for them-
selves, they can rely on the WTO to do it for them.318
A fourth problem exposed by the jet dispute is that member
states with political sensitivities over a case brought against it
in the DSB may attempt to neutralize its effect by bringing par-
allel cases against the original complaining party.319 In the jet
dispute, this strategy was successfully employed by Brazil. 320 A
situation which began with Canada complaining about Brazil's
Embraer subsidies has changed radically and into one in which
Brazil is currently awaiting the result of its request of $3.36 bil-
lion (U.S.) in retaliatory measures against Canada.321 In addi-
tion, frustrated complaining parties who have been successful in
the DSB, without practical effect, may cause further trade-
distorting effects by granting impermissible subsidies to their
own domestic industry, even though this self-help form of "sub-
sidy matching" has been expressly disapproved by the DSB.322
Afterall, both Canada and Brazil claim to be merely matching
illegal subsidies granted to the other's jet industry.323 Super-
vised subsidy matching would serve to lessen such unilateralism
and gamesmanship.
The final serious problem the jet dispute has revealed is
that parties to a dispute will try to avoid compliance by "restruc-
turing" a subsidy program and continuing to grant subsidies
315. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, paras. 4.128-4.143.
316. Chase, supra note 272 and accompanying text.
317. MacKinnon, supra note 9; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
318. Chase, supra note 257 and accompanying text (showing that Canada's goal
was simply to match the subsidies given by Brazil).
319. See supra notes 87-88, 104 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 47, 104 and accompanying text.
321. WTO Panel Report, Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Re-
gional Aircraft, WT/DS222/7, (May 24, 2002), paras. 1-2, available at
http://www.wto.org and 2002 WL 1046056.
322. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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under the "new" program, which they claim is compliant.324 In
the jet dispute, both the PROEX program and a variety of Ca-
nadian subsidy programs clearly were subject to this kind of
tinkering. To avoid this type of creative "restructuring," a
stricter standard needs to be imposed. 325  This new standard
must encourage complete removal of subsidy programs by allow-
ing evidence of specific targeting of an export-oriented sector in
one of these restructured programs. 26 Coupled with evidence of
prior prohibited use of the subsidy program from previous pro-
ceedings, this new standard would demonstrate prohibited ex-
port contingency in compliance proceedings.327 The burden
should then shift to the member subsidizing those specific sec-
tors to disprove the relationship of contingency or dependence of
the subsidy to exports. 328 Additionally, while the DSB has de-
clined to give guidelines for implementation of its rulings, stat-
ing that is not its role, perhaps it needs to be given more of a
role in that process. If it did have such a role, it might have
shortened the length of the still existent jet dispute.
CONCLUSION
If an all-out trade war develops between Brazil and Canada,
it would be another example of the failure of the system, the
grand experiment with a binding system of international dis-
pute resolution. Such a failure could even retard the evolution
towards centralization of trade disputes in the WTO/GATT sys-
tem. Therefore, the importance of the compliance issues raised
by the Brazil-Canada jet dispute goes beyond the specific com-
plaints raised in those proceedings and needs to be addressed.
With reform, the WTO should be able to play a more effective
role than it has to date in defusing tensions between member
states over trade disputes, such as the regional jets case. If re-
spect for the system was one issue in the beef and bananas dis-
putes, it may be the most important issue in the Canada/Brazil
jet subsidy wars.
324. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 152, 165 and accompanying text (showing that Appellate
Body focused on no new issues and declined to set general guidelines).
326. WT/DS46/R, supra note 42, para. 8.5.
327. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
[Vol.12:l
